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LETus PROJECT an ambitious plan and try to 
follow it as far as time permits. First of all, let us see if we can ob- 
tain some perspective on the research process so as to see what it 
is that researchers attempt. Second, let us determine the function of 
experimental design in that process. Third, let us list some of the 
variables which can be taken into account by a good experimental 
design. Finally, let us look at a control group type of research design 
and see how it takes into account the variables discussed above. Ob- 
viously, there is so much to include that we shall not be able to cover 
all of this material in detail. 
What is it that we are trying to do in research? The terms “experi- 
mentation’’ and “research” mean many things to different people. 
To some they mean trying something out to see how well they like 
it. To scientists they mean careful work and precise methodology. 
“Research in education” too often takes on the connotation of the 
former rather than the latter, but there is a considerable difference 
between merely trying something out and observing its effect, and 
the careful measurement and analysis we except in research. When 
one tries something out on an informal basis, one more or less un- 
consciously evaluates it against what was used in the situation be- 
fore. This informal evaluation represents a chain of reasoning to 
determine the better method. In research, one consciously establishes 
a basis for comparison and delineates the basis on which the com- 
parison is to be made. Basically, one tries to build a very tight chain 
of argument to the effect that something may be true. This is the 
first aspect of the perspective on the research process. 
A second aspect of the perspective is gained when we ask, “Of 
what does this chain of argument consist?” It usually starts with a 
hunch that some relation exists (for instance, that decentralization 
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of the library results in its greater use) or that some practice is true 
( a  particular way of cataloging leads to greater accessibility). At 
this step, we are formulating an hypothesis around which we hope 
to build a chain of reasoning which will show whether or not the 
hypothesis is true. As the next step, we must gather some observa- 
tions which would permit us to ascertain the truth or falsity of our 
hunch or hypothesis. As we decide where we will make our observa- 
tions, we make decisions about the sample which we shall use. When 
we make the decisions about what we shall observe, we define op- 
erationally the terms in our hypothesis, definitions which are the 
measures of the variables in our study. We choose in what setting 
we shall observe the phenomenon in question, making sure that we 
observe the correct thing and that what we observe is not affected 
by some extraneous variable that is not part of our hypothesis. At 
this point, we are developing our experimental design. Thus in many 
instances our experimental design contrasts observations in an ex-
perimental setting with those taken in a like setting where the ex- 
periment was not carried on. (This is the contrast between an experi- 
mental and a control group.) Finally, we must have some way of 
evaluating our observations to see whether what we expected did 
indeed occur and that this occurrence was not a chance happening, 
that is, a happening which might have occurred because of the 
particular sample chosen. A statistical model assists us in arriving 
at  this conclusion. 
These are the steps involved in building the chain to permit an 
inference about the truth or falsity of an hypothesis when we are 
doing experimental educational research. Obviously, not all educa- 
tional research is experimental. Certainly there is very good educa- 
tional research which deals with philosophical questions, but this 
falls outside the scope of this discussion. 
The research process comes into better focus when we note a third 
aspect of this perspective on educational research, namely that there 
is a direct parallel, between an experiment which is statistically evalu- 
ated and the problem solving that we do everyday. In the research 
situation, however, we are much more self-conscious about the way 
in which we perform each of the steps and about making sure that 
we have accounted for possible alternative explanations of the phe- 
nomenon that we are observing. 
In  both instances, we start with some sort of a hunch about what 
is true which leads us to make observations to ascertain the truth 
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or falsity of that hunch. The use of operational definitions and meas- 
ures in educational research, however, is perhaps a more careful way 
of focusing our perceptions than we typically use. Similarly, the de- 
velopment of a sampling plan or an experimental design represents 
more careful attention to the matter of what and under what cir- 
cumstances we observe than we typically apply to everyday prob- 
lem solving. In everyday problem solving we typically apply some 
logic to the phenomena which we observe to determine the truth 
or falsity of our hunch. In the experimental situation, a combination 
of the statistics that we bring to bear on this situation, together with 
the experimental design, represents the application of logic. The logic 
being used, however, is a kind of mathematical logic applied to nu- 
merical data rather than the logic applied to a verbal description of 
situations. This application of logic permits us to evaluate the extent 
to which the observations support our hunch or hypothesis. But in 
experimental research the evaluation is given in numerical terms; in 
everyday problem solving, it is phrased in verbal terms. 
The chain which we are attempting to build, then, is not an un- 
familiar one. The chain is unfamiliar only when it is applied to a 
situation not typical of everyday life. As a chain is only as strong as 
its weakest link, so any argument is only as strong as each of its 
steps. 
I t  should be noted that this chain of argumentation is a deductive 
argument. As Lord Hume pointed out many years ago, it is basically 
impossible to prove an inductive proposition by deductive argument. 
This gives us the fourth element in the perspective on the research 
process. With a deductive chain we cannot prove an inductive prop- 
osition. Thus it is better to view each experiment as a carefully eval- 
uated instance in which a given proposition validly predicts the ex- 
periment’s results, or is invalidated. An inductive proposition is true 
until we find an instance in which the hypothesis does not predict 
the experiment’s results. Each experiment is an attempt to find an- 
other instance in which the hypothesis does predict accurately. If it 
should prove unsuccessful, the hunch or inductive proposition must 
be revised. An inductive proposition builds through the accumulation 
of a series of situations in which it has been found to predict suc- 
cessfully. As we demonstrate its predictive accuracy in each new in- 
stance, we tend to become more certain of its truth. 
This in turn suggests a fifth aspect in our perspective on research. 
Since any instance can only be another confirming argument for an 
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inductive proposition, we see that a proposition is most useful if it 
grows out of a series of previously confirmed propositions or to put 
it another way, that it has a theoretical base. 
One last aspect of the perspective on research may be gained by 
looking at this chain of reasoning. Almost any experiment has some 
flaw in it that might possibly invalidate the argument. This is par- 
ticularly true of social science research. In reality it is almost never 
possible to build a completely tight chain of argumentation. Each 
chain is a compromise between what we can do and what we would 
ideally wish to do. Our statistical model almost never completely fits. 
Our experimental design is never completely tight. We are never sure 
that our sampling has not given us a biased sample. In each instance, 
we build the best possible chain of argument to show the truth or 
falsity of the proposition, but each design represents a compromise 
between the ideal and the possible. I t  is up to each person to evaluate 
the design and to determine whether indeed he will accept the evi- 
dence which stems from that compromise. In essence, he must ex-
amine the compromise to see whether it is satisfactory to him. 
Let us review this perspective on research which we have at- 
tempted to sketch. We have noted that we are building a chain of 
argumentation in each experiment. This chain is parallel to the rea- 
soning we use in everyday problem-solving. Each experiment is an 
attempt to determine whether the prediction of our hypothesis is in- 
valid. We cannot by a single deductive chain of argumentation (which 
each experiment basically is) prove the hunch or hypothesis which 
we have. We can merely give another instance in which the hypo- 
thesis escapes invalidation. But even then our chain of argumenta- 
tion is not completely tight. It is always a compromise between the 
ideal and that which it is realistic to expect in the situations in which 
we operate. We must examine each experiment to determine whether 
we are willing to accept the compromise which had to be made and 
to accept this as new evidence that the hypothesis has indeed escaped 
invalidation. 
This is quite a different picture from the popular conception of 
the way in which research progresses, but it is nonetheless a realistic 
picture. When one considers the millions of explanations of phenom- 
ena that are possible but false, we realize that the world abounds 
with more false than true hypotheses. Thus the value of the process 
in winnowing out false hypotheses is certainly not to be discounted. 
If this account is something less than perhaps we might hope, it 
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is all the more important to understand this process in this day and 
age, when we turn increasingly to research in the social sciences for 
help in answering our pressing problems. The social sciences tried 
things out and discarded old methods and explanatory concepts for 
years on an informal basis. Social science research is a kind of rea-
soning that brings added precision to an evaluation of those methods 
and concepts. It formalizes the criteria on which we decide whether 
to accept or to discard the propositions advanced. It makes public the 
criteria with clarity and also provides some basis for judging how 
well they are met. It helps cut through the bramble to a clearer deci- 
sion. The tighter the research, the better its chain of argumentation, 
and the more carefully it is built, then the more value it has in pro- 
viding a basis for decision making. 
We have sketched some of the perspective on experimentation, 
and we have noted that each reader of research must examine the 
chain of experimentation for himself. This suggests that it would be 
well for us to examine the various steps in the chain a little more 
closely. 
Let us start with hypotheses. We indicated that an hypothesis is 
a notion, a hunch, or a guess that something is true about our uni-
verse. We have already noted one thing which it is important to look 
for in an hypothesis or a hunch. Since each experiment is an instance 
in which an hypothesis is confirmed or disconfirmed, clearly one 
would be more likely to grant it credence if it is based upon pre- 
viously confirmed hypotheses. This suggests that ultimately in the 
field of library science it is desirable to build a series of interrelated 
laws and propositions about what makes libraries more effective and 
what makes for better training of librarians. The building of laws or 
principles, and the testing of hypotheses which lead to new laws and 
new principles, is the line along which the most desirable kinds of 
hypotheses are to be found. 
In what ways does the formulation of an hypothesis lead to the 
next step in the chain? The hypothesis contains the terms which must 
be operationally defined. These terms specify the kinds of phenomena 
that will be observed. The hypothesis indicates the nature of the re- 
lationship between variables to be observed. Thus it suggests the 
kind of situation in which they should be studied if we are to find 
such a relationship. This, of course, leads to a definition of experi- 
mental design. Finally, the generality with which the hypothesis is 
to be held suggests the nature of the sample on which we shall wish 
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to make our observations. Clear formulation of the hypothesis is thus 
a step with important implications for the rest of the chain of argu- 
ment. 
The terms in the hypothesis describe the phenomena which must 
be expressed in operational definitions. What is meant by an opera- 
tional definition? The term “intelligence” illustrates one common ex-
ample of an operational definition. Intelligence is nothing we can 
touch or feel or smell or in other ways subject to our senses. We can 
observe various acts which we define as exhibiting intelligence. Typi- 
cally, we use a test situation for this purpose and we define the opera- 
tions which lead to success on that examination as an operational 
definition of what we mean by intelligence. 
Wherever we can, we quantify our operational definition. Thus we 
can evaluate how well the individual does on a test situation in terms 
of words; he did “well” or “poorly.” But typically such descriptions 
do not convey as precisely as numbers how well the individual did. 
If in contrast we say that the individual had an intelligence quotient 
of 150,we know him to be an extremely unusual individual, in fact, 
we can tell in numerical terms how often such a score would typi- 
cally occur. Quantification also permits us to apply statistical models, 
and so in experimentation we use quantification as often as possible 
to permit us to define our terms precisely and to make discrimina- 
tions as exactly as possible. 
We might parenthetically note that new fields of science typically 
start out with verbal description, moving to descriptive categories and 
finally to some sort of numerical scales as the field develops into a 
science. This development can be found historically in the natural 
sciences, and various social sciences are now in the process of transi- 
tion. Although I am not acquainted with enough library research to 
know where your field lies today in this transitional process, it helps 
perhaps to realize that this kind of progression does exist. 
Returning then to our chain of argument, we noted that the hypo- 
thesis suggested the generality with which the proposition should 
apply. But typically we do not investigate the phenomenon with all 
of the instances or all the people to whom it should apply. These 
people are thought of as the population, and we study the hypothesis 
as it applies to only a portion of these instances-a sample of the 
population. The means of selecting the sample is important, and is 
one step which has been carefully studied in the chain of argumenta- 
tion. The manner of selecting a sample has implications for the kind 
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of statistics which can be used. We cannot go into a discussion of 
the ways in which samples are chosen here, but suffice it to say that 
this is one step in the chain which needs to be carefully handled. 
The next step is that of experimental design, a key link in the 
chain. If you could change your library training curriculum so that 
you turned out better students, how would you be sure that it was 
this particular change which resulted in the production of these stu- 
dents? Perhaps it was that you had given more effort to the train- 
ing; perhaps you had obtained new staff; perhaps you had provided 
additional facilities or texts. There are many possible explanations. 
Repeated observation of an experimental effect made in situations 
where we can be aware of other variables which might have caused 
that effect permit us to eliminate these variables as possibilities. But 
there are other ways we can rule them out. We may measure the 
effect of the contaminating variables, create a situation in which these 
contaminating variables do not occur, or arrange for the contamina- 
tion to be held constant across the groups to be evaluated. The ex- 
perimental design permits us to eliminate these alternative explana- 
tions and to control contaminating effects; it allows us insofar as pos- 
sible, to isolate the effects of the experimental variables and measure 
them cleanly. Clearly this is a critical step in the successful forging 
of a chain of experimentation. We shall return to this step later and 
examine it in more detail, but let us proceed to the last step in the 
chain. 
Finally, there is the statistical model which permits us to estimate 
the likelihood that the experimental effect observed is indeed an un- 
usual one. Unusual in what sense? Unusual in the sense that it ex-
ceeds by some specified margin the results which we might expect 
from the fact that every sample chosen from a population will vary 
from every other sample and thus yield different experimental results. 
On occasion the particular sample chosen may have been a rarely 
occurring one which led to an unusual result; this is a chance that 
we must take in using statistics. Statistics merely tell us how unusual 
a particular result is. If the result is so unusual as to occur only rarely 
because of sampling fluctuation, we tend to believe that the instance 
which we are observing is likely due to something other than sampling 
fluctuation, If our chain of experimentation is tight, then we con-
clude that this is an instance in which the experimental effect that 
we are looking for has been observed. 
In a sense we may think of the statistical model as a control for 
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the variability of sampling. I t  makes it possible for us to measure 
and estimate the effect of the sampling error. It permits us to estimate 
the likelihood that the situation which we observed was one which 
could be typically accounted for by sampling variability. If we find 
that we cannot account for the studied effect because of sampling 
error, if our experimental design is tight enough so that we cannot 
blame contaminating variables, if our operational definitions are ac- 
ceptable, and if we have used a proper sample of the population to 
which we wish the generalization to apply, then we can assume that 
we have another instance in which the hypothesis that we are testing 
has been verified. This is the nature of the chain of reasoning that we 
build in the social sciences. 
To this point we have tried to gain some perspective on the re- 
search process and to examine the steps in the chain of argumenta- 
tion which permits the process to proceed. We have tried to indi- 
cate the place of experimental design in this chain of argumentation. 
I t  is a means of devising a situation in which the observations can 
be made so that various alternative exglanations which might other- 
wise account for the phenomenon in question are ruled out. NOW to 
look in greater detail at this particular step in the chain, to see how 
a design works. But to do this we need first of all to list some of 
the kinds of contaminating variables, some of the alternative explana- 
tions which might otherwise cause the phenomenon in question to 
occur but which are not the cause for which we are looking. The list 
that I shall use has been drawn from a chapter written by Donald 
Campbell and Julian Stanley entitled “Experimental Design” and 
published in the Handbook of Research on Teaching which was pub- 
lished in 1963.l I would urge that you consult this excellent source 
for a more complete description of the topics than I can possibly 
give here. 
Let us begin our listing of rival hypotheses with an example. Sup- 
pose you are interested in the kind of reference use students make 
of a library as a result of the kind of teaching to which they are ex- 
posed. You are making observations in a number of schools in dif- 
ferent communities, and in one of these communities the local televi- 
sion station happens to show a film on the use of the library. This, 
of course, is an event which is outside of your control but clearly 
would affect your observations. One might find that the children in 
this community were more expert in their reference work in the li-
brary than those in another community, and one might be led to 
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infer that this is due to the teaching in the school. This kind of event, 
which occurs during the experiment and which may affect the ob- 
servations, is labeled “history” by Campbell and Stanley. I t  is an 
example of the kind of rival hypothesis that would account for the 
observations and lead one to believe that the experimental variable 
(in this case the kind of teaching) had an effect which it clearly did 
not have. 
Let us examine some other contaminating variables or types of 
rival hypotheses. The effects of “maturation” processes within the 
persons observed which occur as a function of the passage of time 
also can produce effects which could be confused with experimental 
effect. Suppose one is studying story telling to very young children. 
Differences in age would result in differences in attention span which 
might frequently account for the way they respond to stories told 
them. Here the effect of maturation may be greater than the way 
the teacher tells the story or the kind of story that is told. 
Another effect which is particularly important where we are dealing 
with two observations, observations before and after an experimental 
variable has been introduced, is named “testing” by Campbell and 
Stanley. Here we are concerned with the effects of taking a test on 
repeated testing; we are particularly concerned with what might be 
called the practice effect gained by the test taker. Clearly the second 
time a person takes a test he is more familar with it and is more likely 
to do better than the first time. Sometimes, also, he will have had a 
chance to discuss the test results and determine what is the “approved 
or the “correct” answer and so the second testing reflects the “test 
wiseness” of the test taker rather than the effect of the experimental 
variable. Clearly this is another class of rival hypotheses that must be 
controlled. 
“Instrumentation” is the class of rival hypotheses that arises be- 
cause of changes in the way observers view a situation. Observers 
watching how businesslike students act in the library might use dif- 
ferent standards at different times in observing the students. Inter- 
viewers trying to find out about reading habits might get different 
responses because of their own increased familiarity with the inter- 
view schedule over a period of time. Shifts in grading standards, learn- 
ing how to administer a test, learning how to use an observation 
check list, these all constitute rival hypotheses to the main hypothesis, 
and they can result in the gathering of data which shows an effect like 
the experimental effect anticipated. 
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“Regression effect” is important where one deals with extreme 
groups. Suppose a group is picked because they did poorly on some 
test, a reading test, for instance. On retesting this group at a later 
date we can predict that they will have a higher average score than 
previously, not because of the effect of any treatment which might 
have intervened between testings, or because of the practice effect 
of the second testing. The change results from the imperfect corre- 
spondence of the score on one testing with scores in the second ses- 
sion. Unless we have a perfectly accurate measuring instrument, scores 
which are very high or very low may be expected to change on retest 
in the direction of the average scores of the population from which 
this group was taken. Our social science measures are almost never 
perfect. Thus, a poor group singled out on the basis of a test does 
better on retest after treatment, whereas a bright group may appear 
to have lost ground between pre- and post-test. Both findings are the 
result of regression effect, rather than of treatment effect. This is a 
very common finding in the literature, although it is rarely recognized 
as due to regression. The regression @ect should, therefore, be an- 
ticipated wherever the selected groups are taken from the extremes 
of a distribution of scores and then retested on that same or a related 
measure to determine the effect of some experimental variables. 
“Selection” is another source of rival hypotheses. Suppose you have 
a wonderful new information retrieval system for school libraries 
which you want to try out. Making it available on a voluntary basis 
you compare the themes of students who use the retrieval system with 
those who do not. Is there anything about those who volunteered 
which makes them special and which might have resulted in their 
doing better themes anyway? Clearly the different recruitment sys- 
tems used in making up a sample may result in selecting people who 
are atypical in some way so that the effect observed is due to “selec- 
tion” rather than to the experimental variable in question. 
“Mortality,” or the selective dropping of individuals from a group 
over the course of an experiment, is another source of rival hypotheses. 
Campbell and Stanley cite the fact that studies show freshmen women 
to be more beautiful than seniors. Does education decrease the pul- 
chritude of college coeds? We would be unlikely to admit that this is 
the case. The rival hypothesis that a selected dropout exists because 
of marriage seems much more plausible. 
Sometimes we have an interaction between one of the sources of 
rival hypotheses and the treatment effect that we are expecting to 
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produce. Such is the case when we pretest a group. We call this 
“interaction of testing and treatment.” If we give a group a pretest, 
we focus their attention on the characteristics which we hope to 
change. We are thus more likely to cause increased change with 
respect to these variables. If you were to pretest students with respect 
to their knowledge of the Dewey Decimal system, when you later 
discuss the Dewey Decimal system in class, they are more likely to be 
alert for information about it than students who were not pretested. 
There is also likely to be greater retention of this information had 
you not raised the questions about the Dewey Decimal system as all. 
This is an example of the interaction between “testing” (in this case 
pretesting) and the treatment. There are other interaction effects, 
but we do not have time to discuss them here. 
Let us discuss only one other source of rival hypotheses. The very 
fact that you are running an experiment is frequently the cause of 
change in the subjects. Many of you know of the Western Electric 
Company experiments which were done at the Hawthorne plant in 
Chicago in the 1920’s. They were attempting to find how they could 
increase production. Whether they increased the lighting or de-
creased it, whether they improved the working arrangements or 
made them more awkward, whether they improved the ventilation or 
made it worse, they found that production went up because the work- 
ers felt they were special. The workers felt that they were part of 
an experimental group. Typically dubbed the “Hawthorne Effect,” 
Campbell and Stanley use the name “reactive arrangements,” to in- 
clude the Hawthorne Effect and other aspects of an experimental set- 
ting to which the subjects might react. The artificiality of the experi- 
mental setting itself often results in an effect which is mistakenly 
taken to be the result of the experimental variable. The play acting, 
outguessing, up for inspection, “I am a guinea pig,” or whatever other 
attitudes are the result of the experimental situation, are all included 
here. 
This is by no means a complete list of all the sources of rival hy- 
potheses. I t  is enough to give some idea of their nature, however, SO 
that we can see how they are handled by an experimental design. 
As the final step in this discussion, let us take a common experi- 
mental design and see the way in which this design provides some 
control on rival hypotheses. Let us study the typical control group 
design with which we are all familiar. In this design we have two 
groups to which individuals are randomly assigned. We observe these 
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two groups at the beginning of the experiment on those variables 
which we have operationally defined as resulting from the experi- 
mental treatment. One of the two groups chosen at random is sub-
jected to some sort of experimental situation; the other is not. We 
then observe afterwards to determine what, if any, effect the treat- 
ment has had. 
For example, a group of fifth grade children is assigned randomly 
to each of two classrooms. A classroom library is available to each of 
the classrooms, one arranged according to one classification system, 
the other arranged by a different system. We observe the children’s 
skill in using these classroom libraries for reference work at the be- 
ginning of the year and at the end. Let us assume that the only train- 
ing that these children have in using the library was given by an 
English teacher who serves both classes. Let us now look at  the vari- 
ous sources of rival hypotheses that we have discussed. 
Does this design control for “historical” events? In general, I think 
we can see that it does. Except for those events which might have 
occurred in one class but not in the other, “history” would be con- 
trolled. For instance, television programs instructing the children on 
use of the library would presumably be observed by as many fifth 
graders in one room as the other. 
What about the effects of “maturation?” Presumably again these 
would be the same for both of the groups, since if we took a common 
pool of children and assigned them at random to these two groups, 
the effects of maturation or growth over the course of the experiment 
would be the same in the control as in the experimental group. The 
effects of “testing” similarly would be controlled in the sense that 
presumably background experience in testing would be equal for the 
two groups since we randomly,assigned them to the control and ex- 
perimental sections. Both groups would have the same pre- and post- 
observation experiences, so the effect of the second testing, as well 
as chances for them to discuss the test, would be comparable for both 
experimental and control groups. 
The effects of “instrumentation” would also be typically controlled 
in that the observer’s increased familiarity with the observation in- 
strument would apply as well to the control group as to the experi- 
mental group. We should note, however, that one condition here is 
that the observer would not know which is the experimental and 
which is the control group. If the observer happens to be biased for 
or against the particular effect that one is seeking he might look 
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harder for it in the experimental group if he knew which group was 
which. 
Even if these were extreme groups, which they happen not to be 
in our example, the effects of “regression” would be held constant 
across the groups, since the regression effect for two extreme groups 
randomly assigned to an experimental and a control session will be 
the same. The effects of “selection” would be equated between control 
and experimental groups, provided that the sample was chosen in one 
step and then assigned randomly to experimental and control groups. 
Similarly the effects of “mortality” would be the same in control 
and experimental groups, since presumably such effects as illness 
would cause children to drop equally out of both control and experi- 
mental groups. Should the experimental treatment prove distasteful, 
however, there might be an interaction between treatment and “mor- 
tality” which would cause an uncontrolled source of rival hypotheses. 
M’hat about another interaction, that between “testing” and treat- 
ment? This is an uncontrolled effect, for only in the experimental 
group do you have both the conditions of treatment and “testing.” 
Thus this design does not control for the effect of inter-action between 
“testing” and treatment, 
Does it control for “reactive effects?” This depends on how the con- 
trol group is treated. If the control group thinks that they are special 
as much as the experimental group does, then we have this control 
between the two groups. If on the other hand, the experimental group 
realizes they are experimental but the control group does not, then 
“reactive effects” may also be a source of rival hypotheses. 
Perhaps this is enough of an illustration to indicate the way in 
which experimental design can control €or sources of change which 
might otherwise be confused with the one we wish to study. We could 
continue and discuss other experimental designs, and analyze them 
with respect to this incomplete catalog of rival hypotheses. The Camp- 
bell and Stanley chapter does this very well, examining a variety of 
such designs, as well as describing additional rival hypotheses. 
In the short time available, hopefully you have gained some per- 
spective on the research process, seen the function of experimental 
design in this process, learned some of the variables that can be con-
trolled by experimental design, and seen how experimental design 
contributes to the chain of argumentation by controlling these vari- 
ables. Hopefully also this will have stimulated enough interest in the 
process of experimental research that you will desire to study the 
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topic further, and bring experimental methods into your own field 
and further the stature of library science as a science. 
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